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The Return of the Kurdish Question 
On the Situation of the Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Turkey 
Günter Seufert 
For decades, the roughly twenty-nine million Kurds living in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria were regarded primarily as a threat to the territorial integrity of those states and 
thus to the stability of the Middle East. Today the region is marked by state collapse, 
rampant terrorism, and signs of unravelling in the established system of states. These 
developments have brought about fundamental changes in the position of the Kurds 
and the role they play in regional politics. 
 
While the situation is most precarious in 
Syria and Iraq, whose national unity is 
currently largely theoretical, several other 
states are also experiencing major political 
difficulties in regard to the political inte-
gration of linguistically and confessionally 
diverse populations. In certain quarters, 
strategists are already drawing a complete-
ly new set of frontiers for the Middle East – 
changes that would leave neither Jordan, 
Lebanon, Israel nor even Turkey untouched. 
Kurds and Jihadists 
The immediate threat to state unity is not 
war between states, but conflicts involving 
non-state armed groups (NSAGs) that build 
largely on ethnic/linguistic and religious/ 
confessional identities. In other words, 
NSAGs fighting states or other NSAGs. 
The two most important non-state armed 
currents in the Middle East are the Salafist/ 
jihadist Sunni Muslim formations, such as 
the “Islamic State” (IS) and the al-Qaeda 
offshoot al-Nusra, and the various strands 
of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq, 
Turkey and Syria. 
Thus, alongside a tremendous upsurge of 
violent Islamism, the region is experiencing 
a hitherto unseen renaissance of Kurdish 
politics. The Iraqi Kurds hope for an oppor-
tunity to declare independence, which 
would hasten the dissolution of Iraq. In 
Turkey the government’s peace talks with 
the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) have run aground and full-blown war 
is bound to restart. In Syria the Kurds will 
be unable to hold their autonomous regions 
without Western assistance. Any withdraw-
al of the Syrian Kurdish PYD would risk 
another wave of ethnic cleansing. The hu-
manitarian crisis and associated refugee 
flows from Syria and Iraq, the necessity to 
reestablish a viable regional order, and its 
own energy dependency may force Europe 
to rethink its policy towards the Kurds. 
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The Iraqi Kurds’ Desire for 
Statehood 
Drawing on US assistance, the Iraqi Kurds 
have created an autonomous federal entity 
recognised by Baghdad, in which Masud 
Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
is the strongest political force. The military 
support supplied by Iran when the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) came under IS 
attack demonstrates that the Kurdish entity 
in Iraq is treated as a legitimate factor in 
the region today, as does Turkey’s close 
cooperation. The US intervention to defend 
the Iraqi Kurds against IS advances, and 
arms deliveries from Germany and the 
Czech Republic, both underline the inter-
national recognition of Kurdish autonomy 
in Iraq. 
The Iraqi Kurds have postponed but not 
abandoned their wish for independence. 
Despite most of the feared consequences 
having already occurred, Western states 
refuse to consider statehood for the Iraqi 
Kurds on the grounds that it would threat-
en the internal cohesion of Iraq and boost 
Kurdish autonomy movements in neigh-
bouring states. At the same time, a series of 
factors feeds the desire for independence: 
closer diplomatic and military ties between 
Erbil and the West created by the fighting 
against IS; close economic cooperation 
between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey; and 
worsening mutual hostility between Sunnis 
and Shiites in Iraq. The latter, above all, 
casts a pall over the future of the Iraqi state. 
Another factor favouring statehood is the 
ongoing failure of Baghdad and Erbil to 
reach a final agreement on disputed areas 
claimed by both (including Kirkuk) and 
the sharing of oil and gas reserves. Other 
factors mitigate against moving towards 
statehood, for instance mistrust and rivalry 
between the major political groupings of 
the Iraqi Kurds: the KDP, the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Gorran 
Party. In 1998 the rivalry reached such 
heights that American mediation was 
required to defuse armed clashes. Tensions 
between the KDP and the PKK and grave 
deficits in the institutional structures and 
political culture of the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) also speak against em-
barking upon the adventure of statehood. 
In view of the gamut of uncontrollable 
variables, Europe cannot simply pick one 
option or another. Instead, Europe should 
push for maximum compromise between 
Erbil and Baghdad and work with the KRG 
in Iraqi Kurdistan to bring about long-term 
improvements in infrastructure, institutions 
and democracy. With respect to tensions 
among the Kurds, the establishment of a 
pan-Kurdish public sphere should be en-
couraged. That is important both for direc-
ting the rivalry between the Iraqi Kurdish 
parties into peaceful channels, and for 
keeping ongoing conflicts between the KDP 
and the PKK in check. In the short term, 
additional humanitarian assistance for 
refugees is required. The KRG should also 
continue to receive military support for its 
fight against IS, with equipment and train-
ing adapted to the circumstances. Disrup-
tion of internal Kurdish and Iraqi power 
balances should be avoided.  
Turkey’s Policy towards  
Kurdistan-Iraq 
Erbil’s relations with Ankara are still deli-
cate, despite intense recent economic and 
energy cooperation serving mutual inter-
ests. While Turkey was still presenting itself 
as Iraqi Kurdistan’s guarantor in June 2014, 
it failed to intervene when IS attacked three 
months later. Ankara has vacillated in 
recent years, adopting a series of very differ-
ent attitudes towards Kurdish autonomy in 
Iraq – from strict rejection to recognition 
and finally declaration of the Kurds’ right 
to independence. Turkey’s policy towards 
Kurdish Northern Iraq is strongly influ-
enced by whatever strategy it is pursuing 
towards the PKK at a particular moment, 
and therefore tends to be unreliable. Where 
Ankara once feared that greater self-govern-
ment for Kurdistan-Iraq would directly 
boost the autonomy demands of the Turkish 
Kurds, today it hopes that Masud Barzani 
might stem the influence of PKK leader 
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Abdullah Öcalan. A further element of un-
certainty is Turkish designs on the former 
Ottoman provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk. 
Whether under Turgut Özal (1983–1993) or 
in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s foreign policy specu-
lations: Ankara regards Mosul and Kirkuk 
as potential additions to Turkey. Such 
ideas, like the instrumentalisation of the 
Iraqi Kurds against the Turkish, cannot be 
said to contribute to regional stabilisation. 
Europe should therefore work for a politi-
cal consolidation of the KRG’s relations 
with Baghdad, while also pushing for an 
understanding between the KDP and the 
PKK, which would have to involve both 
sides.  
An Assessment of the  
Syrian Kurdish PYD  
Although the Democratic Union Party (PYD) 
occupies a hegemonic position among the 
organisations of Syria’s Kurds, various 
factors have earned it a great deal of criti-
cism and led the German government to 
refuse contact. The main objections are its 
very close connections to the PKK, its refusal 
to join the Sunni Arab-dominated opposi-
tion to Assad, its at least intermittent co-
operation with Damascus, and repression 
against rival Kurdish parties. But the party’s 
strategic decision to concentrate on defend-
ing Kurdish areas within Syria and estab-
lishing local self-administration must in 
retrospect be acknowledged as the best 
choice for the Kurdish population. The 
same applies to its partial cooperation with 
Damascus, which must be seen in the con-
text of a series of pragmatic temporary 
alliances between opposing forces in the 
civil war. It must also be emphasised that 
the PYD is strongly rooted in the Kurdish 
population of northern Syria, that it pur-
sues a progressive policy on women, and 
that it involves non-Kurds and non-Muslims 
in its administration. Just how seriously it 
takes the integration of non-Muslim Kurds 
was demonstrated in summer 2014, when 
it saved the Kurdish-speaking Yazidis in the 
Iraqi Sinjar Mountains from the clutches of 
the IS in an operation that demonstrated 
the fighting strength of the PYD guerrillas. 
Ultimately it is decisive for the Kurds – and 
for the Assyrian Christians of northern 
Syria – that there is no alternative to mili-
tary protection by the PYD and the admin-
istration it dominates. Considering the 
Syrian Kurds’ legitimate interest in self-
organisation and security, the demise of the 
moderate Sunni Arab opposition and the 
poor prospects for an undivided Syria, the 
blanket refusal of German politicians to 
deal directly with the PYD can no longer be 
justified. Germany’s Western allies have 
long since gone other ways. The United 
States and the United Kingdom maintain 
extremely close military cooperation with 
the YPG guerrilla units of the PYD, whose 
political representatives have been received 
officially in Washington at senior official 
level and in Rome and Paris at ministerial 
and presidential level respectively. Even 
Turkey, where the president and prime 
minister never tire of equating the PYD 
with the “Islamic State”, the party’s co-
leader has been received for talks several 
times. 
The Turkish State’s Negotiations 
with the PKK 
The thirty-year armed struggle of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has forced 
the Turkish state to abandon its policy of 
denying the existence of a Kurdish nation 
with its own language and culture. In 
March 2013, after the PKK ceased fighting 
in 2012, Ankara opened the first official 
peace talks with PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan, who has been imprisoned since 
1999. However, the two sides were pursuing 
contradictory goals. The government 
wished to negotiate only about disarming 
the PKK and reintegrating its fighters into 
society, and otherwise regarded the Kurdish 
question as having been resolved through 
earlier concessions of a cultural nature. The 
governing Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) invoked Muslim brotherhood between 
Turks and Kurds and sought to subsume 
SWP Comments 38 
August 2015 
4 
the Kurds in a conservative Sunni religious 
Turkey. The PKK, on the other hand, in-
sisted on guarantees of political democrati-
sation and decentralisation designed to 
open the door to Kurdish self-administra-
tion within Turkey. It continues to see the 
Kurds as an independent, sovereign entity, 
and itself and its legal arm, the Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (HDP), as their authentic 
representatives. 
The Kurds long believed the only way to 
force the government to make concessions 
was by threatening to resume the armed 
struggle, and that this route would close 
after the parliamentary elections on 7 June 
2015; after that, they feared, they would 
again be at a disadvantage. In the months 
leading up to the election, therefore, 
matters appeared to be coming to a head. 
But in December 2014 the Kurds switched 
to a strategy of deescalation, with the PKK 
emphasising that it had turned its back on 
the armed struggle. In March 2015, Öcalan 
announced that he would call a congress 
to officially end the PKK’s guerrilla war 
against the Turkish state. However, he said, 
the decision was conditional on the estab-
lishment of a monitoring council, a parlia-
mentary commission, a truth commission, 
and a government declaration of intent to 
negotiate over political reforms. 
The Pro-Kurdish Party as 
New Beacon of Hope  
In conjunction with this strategic turn by 
the PKK towards a peaceful resolution of 
the Kurdish question within the borders of 
Turkey, the closely associated legal pro-
Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) 
also altered its programme. On the one 
hand, it sent out feelers to left-wing oppo-
sition forces not represented in parliament 
and sought to forge electoral alliances. On 
the other, it declared itself the champion 
of all marginalised groups in Turkey. In line 
with its demand for recognition of all cul-
tural and political identities, the HDP 
granted promising places on its list for the 
parliamentary elections on 7 June 2015 not 
only to Sunni Kurdish candidates, but also 
to representatives of the Muslim Alevi 
minority, Christians, Jews, as well as trade 
unionists, environmentalists, gays and 
lesbians. 
The success of this strategy, with which 
the Kurds were able to double their vote 
to 13.1 percent for 79 seats in parliament, 
stemmed not only from this reorientation, 
but was also aided by the line taken by the 
governing party. Under the influence of 
its former leader, President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, the AKP built its election cam-
paign entirely around the idea of introduc-
ing a presidential system to legalise and 
consolidate an emerging presidential auto-
cracy of steadily growing strength. That 
represented a nightmare not only for liber-
al forces, but also for the Kemalist elite and 
in general for the secular sections of the 
population, and turned the Kurdish nation-
al movement, which had for decades been 
regarded as the central threat to the integ-
rity of the state, into what growing num-
bers of Turks now regarded as the standard-
bearer of democracy. And indeed, in the 
7 June election the HDP received about 
900,000 votes from ethnic Turkish voters, 
most of whom had previously voted for 
the CHP. This accounted for 2 of the HDP’s 
13 percentage points. 
PKK/HDP as Representative of 
the Kurdish National Movement in 
Turkey 
Ultimately, it was Erdoğan himself who 
drove voters into the arms of the HDP by 
alienating the AKP’s Kurdish supporters, 
who switched their allegiance en masse 
(the other main parties, CHP and MHP, had 
no base among the Kurds to start with). In 
the campaign, Erdoğan courted extreme 
nationalist, anti-Kurdish sentiments and 
rejected any idea of future negotiations. As 
such, he continued a course of confronta-
tion set in autumn 2014, when he offended 
many Kurds by equating the resistance of 
the PKK and its Syrian offshoot PYD in the 
Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane with the 
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Islamic State. Erdoğan’s unintended assis-
tance allowed the HDP to attract conserva-
tive and religious Kurds on a grand scale, 
who had until then distanced themselves 
from the left-wing secular ideology of the 
PKK. Integrating large numbers of con-
servative Kurds into its voting base has 
made the HDP the hegemonic party in the 
Kurdish areas of eastern and south-eastern 
Turkey for the first time. In 2011, its pre-
decessor, the BDP, was the strongest force 
in only seven of the eastern and south-
eastern provinces. By 2015, the picture had 
been transformed, with the pro-Kurdish 
party winning in fourteen provinces, thir-
teen of them forming a contiguous area 
along the southern and eastern borders. In 
almost all of these, one can speak of clear 
hegemony, with the HDP falling below 50 
percent only in Ardahan and Kars (31 and 
45 percent respectively). These latter two 
provinces lie in the extreme north-east, 
where Kurds are not a majority. In all the 
other twelve provinces the HDP gained a 
clear absolute majority: Iğdır 57 percent, 
Bitlis 61, Dersim (Tunceli) 61, Siirt 66, Muş 
72, Batman 73, Van 74, Mardin 74, Ağrı 79, 
Diyarbakir 80, Şırnak 86, and Hakkari 88 
percent. In two neighbouring provinces, 
Urfa and Bingöl, the HDP came second with 
40 and 42 percent respectively. 
Another aspect of the election result 
underlines what a great step the HDP has 
taken on the road to becoming the party of 
all the Kurds: It was also the strongest party 
in the province of Dersim (Tunceli), which 
is geographically separated from the Sunni 
Kurdish area and is largely populated by 
Alevi Kurds. In earlier elections, scepticism 
towards their Sunni compatriots had led 
the Alevis of Dersim to vote for the CHP in 
large numbers. So the HDP has not only 
succeeded – like earlier pro-Kurdish parties 
– in gaining the votes of left-wing and rela-
tively secular Kurds, but also achieved a 
majority among religious Sunni and more 
secular Alevi Kurds. And this applies not 
only to the provinces of south-eastern 
Anatolia, but also to the majority Kurdish 
quarters in eight of Turkey’s thirteen 
biggest cities. 
The End of the Peace Process 
In the election, the AKP’s vote dropped from 
49.9 to 40.8 percent, losing it its absolute 
majority. The euphoria this triggered among 
the opposition, including the Kurds, was 
short-lived, however. Ideological differences 
between the three opposition parties ex-
clude them from forming a government 
without the AKP, so Erdoğan and the AKP 
continue to dominate politics. With the 
President delaying the formation of a gov-
ernment and calling for the election to be 
repeated, the AKP has sharpened its course 
against the Kurds in the hope of winning 
back Turkish nationalist voters. Erdoğan, 
thus, continued his pre-election strategy: 
already on 28 April he had declared the end 
of negotiations with the PKK and labelled as 
terrorists and separatists all those who still 
put forward Kurdish demands. The hopes of 
the Kurds that state and government would 
return to negotiations after the election 
vanished into thin air. Ever since it began 
withdrawing its fighters in connection with 
the commencement of talks in 2013, the 
PKK has complained that new military out-
posts and transport routes were being built 
in the region to secure the Turkish army’s 
superiority in any future fighting. On 
11 July, after new waves of arrests by the 
police and a growing number of skirmishes 
with the military, the PKK on announced 
it would end the armistice unless ongoing 
expansion of military bases ceased and 
mass arrests stopped. The reactions of the 
liberal public to this step were divided. On 
the one hand there was understanding. 
After all it was the president who broke off 
the talks without meeting any of the PKK’s 
final, moderate demands, and it was the 
government that cut every contact between 
PKK leader Öcalan and the HDP negotiation 
group after Erdoğan declared the talks 
ended, now four months ago. On the other, 
there was great disillusionment. It was, 
after all, the PKK’s orientation on a longer-
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term process that presented the opportuni-
ty to prevent a resumption of the civil war. 
Despite the radical rhetoric of both sides, 
the cease-fire held until the Islamic State 
bomb attack in the Turkish-Kurdish border 
town of Suruç on 20 July that killed thirty-
two young people. The PKK accused the 
government of siding with IS and “retaliat-
ed” with attacks on police that left three 
dead. On 24 July Turkish jets began bombing 
PKK strongholds in Northern Iraq, claiming 
to have killed up to two hundred fighters 
by the end of July. At the same time, more 
than one thousand people have been de-
tained in operations supposedly directed 
against “terror organisations” including IS, 
but mainly focussing on Kurdish activists. 
Fully fledged civil war is thus back in Turkey.  
This is regrettable, because there is in 
principle agreement in Turkey that the 
Kurdish question must be resolved and a 
new constitution drafted. Will the now 
defunct Kemalist order be replaced in the 
long term by an authoritarian system based 
on a conservative majority – on supporters 
of the AKP and the MHP – and increasingly 
legitimised in terms of Islamic morals and 
terminology? Or can a culturally largely 
neutral legal and institutional framework 
for politics be created? 
Given the choice between these options, 
Turkey finds itself facing similar structural 
challenges to other states in the Middle 
East, even if a range of factors leave it sig-
nificantly more socially, institutionally and 
economically integrated than its southern 
neighbours. Nonetheless: Turkey also has 
great problems politically integrating a 
population politicised and organised along 
cultural lines. 
In view of this, the future strategy of the 
PKK will play a central role for the fate of 
the political system and the stability of the 
country. Germany and Europe should seek 
ways and means to influence the PKK and 
strengthen those forces within the organi-
sation that wish to return to a peaceful 
long-term strategy. Ignoring the PKK as a 
political force and treating it exclusively 
as a terrorist organisation is no longer 
compatible with either the domestic politi-
cal situation in Turkey or the regional 
political developments.  
The Role of the Kurds in the 
Middle East 
What role can and should the Kurds play in 
a Middle East whose future has become so 
unpredictable? The question arises for both 
strands of the Kurdish national movement: 
the Kurds of Iraq, today under the leadership 
of Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP); and the Turkish and Syrian Kurds, 
where the formations around the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Democratic 
Union Party (PYD) represent the strongest 
force. The Kurdish drive for greater self-
government has become virtually impossible 
to ignore – and not simply because these 
two Kurdish currents are today partners of 
the West in the fight against the Islamic 
State. In this connection it is also relevant 
that the Kurds operate as secular currents, 
and in comparison to the nation-states in 
the region exhibit a greater willingness to 
concede equal rights to non-Kurdish and 
non-Muslim groups and integrate them 
politically. Irrespective of their different 
characters, their internal rivalries and their 
obvious democratic deficits, both Kurdish 
groupings are also seeking recognition in 
the United States and Europe. At the same 
time they challenge Iraq and Turkey, as 
states whose stability is crucial for both the 
region and the West. To that extent the two 
strands are today factors promoting both 
stability and instability. Assessments of the 
direction they will take are contingent upon 
the future one imagines for the Middle East. 
It can be said with certainty that there is no 
way back to the former state order, for the 
process that has gripped the system of states 
in the Middle East continues unabated. 
The Uncertain Future of the System 
of States in the Middle East 
The state order in the Middle East dates 
from the First World War and was largely 
SWP Comments 38 
August 2015 
7 
defined by European powers. On 16 May 
1916, France and England concluded the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement dividing eastern 
Anatolia and Mesopotamia, at that time 
still provinces of the Ottoman Empire, into 
British and French dominions and spheres 
of influence. The Russian Revolution and 
the successful Turkish war of independence 
prevented the Agreement’s implementation 
in Anatolia. The roots of both the creation 
of Syria and the Lebanon under French 
mandate and the founding of Iraq, Jordan 
and Israel under British mandate are to 
be found in the Agreement of 1916. The 
decision of the victorious powers to draw 
the borders of the new states – unlike those 
in Europe – without heed to the linguistic/ 
ethnic and religious/confessional allegianc-
es of the population was to have far-reaching 
implications. Worse still, the mandate 
powers built their administration of the 
new states on confessional minorities: 
France on the Alevis in Syria, England on 
the Sunnis in Iraq. The associated exclusion 
of major linguistic and religious groups 
contributed to a politicisation of existing 
ethnic and confessional identities. The 
same also applies to the Kurds, who never 
became an integral component of the 
power structures of the modern nation-
state, but were marginalised and pressured 
to assimilate in the name of Turkish, Arab 
and Persian nationalism. 
After the end of the Cold War, the major 
powers in East and West curtailed their 
support for authoritarian regimes in the 
region, while global discourses about 
equality, political participation and democ-
racy became increasingly relevant. Rising 
levels of education, burgeoning informa-
tion and communication technologies, and 
the global networking of formerly regional 
and local groups enabled by those devel-
opments empowered the de facto largely 
disenfranchised citizens of authoritarian 
states to become political radicalising 
actors organising in the name of traditional 
identities. There is no end in sight to this 
development and the collapse of state order 
it engenders. The states of the Middle East 
have to date utterly failed to respond and 
integrate the protests. On the contrary, 
ethnic cleansing, the associated cultural 
homogenisation and the establishment of 
new quasi-state structures (for example by 
IS) represent worrying harbingers of major 
upheavals still to come. This is the back-
ground to the scenarios of a Middle East 
redivided along cultural lines that are 
today being developed in many quarters.  
Guidelines for European Policy 
towards the Kurds 
However developments turn out, such 
scenarios certainly lie within the realm of 
the possible. This alone is an imperative 
to involve not only the existing states as 
partners in conflict resolution concepts and 
measures, but also the semi-state and non-
state armed actors with which common 
political ground exists – and those include 
the Kurds. European engagement in the 
region should be directed towards resolving 
conflicts through peaceful transformation 
and negotiation. Therefore the actions of 
European powers can no longer be restrict-
ed to supporting the authoritarian policies 
of nation-states against their Kurdish mi-
norities. This strategy has long since lost its 
potential for creating stability. But nor can 
European policy towards the Kurds consist 
exclusively of unconditional solidarity with 
their various political demands. For it is the 
radical solutions on either side that contain 
the greatest potential for violence. What is 
needed is a de-escalating policy seeking con-
sidered compromise and communication. 
And such a policy can only function if its 
protagonists consider multiple alternative 
development paths and open channels of 
communication with all concerned – in-
cluding on the Kurdish side. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2015 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
solely the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 




Telephone  +49 30 880 07-0 




Translation by Meredith Dale 
